This study examines the relationship between R&D project performance and the relative influence of project and functional managers across 86 matrixed teams in nine different research and development organizations. Performance relationships are investigated for three areas of influence within the project team as well as for influence in the overall organization. Analyses show higher project performance when influence over salaries and promotions is perceived as balanced between project and functional managers. Performance reaches its highest level, however, when organizational influence is centered in the project manager and influence over technical details of the work is centered in the functional manager. 
INTRODUCTION
The matrix structure was first developed in Research and Development organizations in an attempt to capture the benefits and minimize the liabilities of two earlier forms of organization. Both project and functional organizations have well known advantages and disadvantages (Marquis, 1969; Kingdon, 1973; Allen, 1977) . The functional alternative, in which departments are organized around disciplines or technologies, enables engineers to stay in touch more easily with new developments in those disciplines or technologies. It has, on the other hand, the disadvantage of creating separations between technologies, making interdisciplinary projects more difficult to coordinate.
The project form of organization overcomes this problem by grouping engineers together on the basis of the problem or project on which they are working, regardless of discipline. Although it makes the coordination and integration of multidisciplinary efforts easier to achieve) the project structure removes individuals from their disciplinary departments. This detachment makes it more difficult for professionals to keep pace with the most recent developments in their underlying disciplines and results in poorer performance on longer-term technical efforts (Marquis & Straight, 1965) .
Forces Inherent in the Matrix
The matrix, by creating an integrating force in a program or project office, attempts to overcome the divisions that are inherent in the basic functional structure. In the matrix, project or program managers and their staff are charged with the responsibility of integrating the efforts of engineers who draw upon a variety of different disciplines and III technical specialties in the development of new products or processes (Galbraith, 1973) . The managers of functional departments, on the other hand, are responsible for making sure that the organization is aware of the most recent developments in its relevant technologies, thereby insuring the technical integrity of products and processes that the program or project office is attempting to develop.
This situation often leads to conflict between the two arms of the matrix. Project managers are often forced by market needs to assume the shorter range view of the marketing function (cf. Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967 ). Since they are responsible for developing a product that can be successfully produced and marketed, project managers take on a perspective that is sometimes more closely aligned to that of marketing or manufacturing than to the perspective held in the research and development organization. Functional department heads, with their closer attachment to underlying technologies, are inclined to take a longer term view and consequently, may be more concerned with the organization's capability to use the most up-to-date technologies than with meeting immediate customer needs.
Both of these issues are necessary to the survival of the organization. Someone has to be concerned with getting new products out into the market, and someone has to be concerned with maintaining the organization's long run technical capability to develop and incorporate technical advancements into future products. Research and development organizations, no matter how they are organized, always have both of these concerns. The matrix structure merely makes them explicit by vesting the two sets of concerns in separate managers.
In formalizing these two distinct lines of managerial influence, the R&D organization is generating "deliberate conflict" between two essential managerial perspectives as a means of balancing these two organizational needs (Cleland, 1968) . Project managers whose prime directive is to get the product "out the door" are matched against functional managers who tend to hold back because they can always make the product "a little bit better", given more time and effort (Marquis, 1969; Allen, 1977) . When these two opposing forces are properly balanced, the organization should achieve a more optimum balance both in terms of product completion and technical excellence. Unfortunately, a balanced situation is not easy to achieve. Often one or the other arm of the matrix will dominate, and then, what appears to be a matrix on paper becomes either a project or a functional organization in operation.
The net effect of matrixed forces on project performance is realized principally by their influence over the behaviors and attitudes of individual engineers. It is the engineers who perform the actual problem solving activities that result in new products or processes. It is they who ultimately determine the form of solution. How engineers view the relative power of project and functional managers over their work lives will strongly influence how they perform their jobs.
Individuals accrue power within organizations by controlling critical resources and by influencing critical problem solving activities and decisions (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1979) . In any organization, including those with matrixed relationships, employees attend more to those managers who have more influence over technical strategies, resources, reward and promotional decisions, and the staffing of projects (Allen, 1977; Pelz and Andrews, 1976; Oldham, 1976) . From the engineer's point of view, then, managers will be seen as powerful and important to the extent that they influence the detailed technical decisions of the engineer's project work, determine his salary and promotional opportunities, and control his assignment to particular project activities. These are three critical areas in which project and functional managers contend for influence, for it is through these supervisory roles that each side of the matrix attempts to motivate and direct the engineer's efforts and performance (Kingdon, 1973) . And the degree to which each side of the matrix is successful in building its power within the R&D organization will have a strong bearing on the outcomes that emerge from the many interdependent project activities (Wilemon and Gemmill, 1971) .
Although a great deal has recently been written about matrix organizations (e.g., Souder, 1979; Hill and White, 1979) , very little is actually known about the effectiveness of these structures (Knight, 1976) . In particular, there has been no research that systematically deals with the relationships between project performance and the distribution of power and influence within the organization. Where should the locus of influence lie between project and functional managers along the more critical dimensions of supervisory influence? Will a balance in power between project and functionally oriented forces result in higher project performance? In an attempt to answer these questions, the present study examines the relationships between project performance and the relative dominance of project and functional managers for 86 matrixed project teams from nine different technology-based organizations.
-6-HYPOTHESES Details of Project Work This is the arena in which matrixed project and functional interests are most likely to come into direct conflict. The project manager has ultimate responsibility for bringing the new product into being and is, therefore, intimately concerned with the technical approaches used in accomplishing that outcome. However, if the project side of the matrix is allowed to dominate development work, two quite different problems can develop. At one extreme, there is the possibility that sacrifices in technical quality and long term reliability will be made in order to meet budget, schedule, and immediate market demands (Knight, 1977) . At the other extreme, product potential is often oversold beyond the organization's current technological capability. Both of these errors are more likely to occur when the project side of the matrix dominates technical decisions.
To guard against these shortcomings, functional managers can be held accountable for the overall integrity of the product's technical content. If the functional side of the matrix becomes overly dominant, however, then the danger is that the product will include not only more sophisticated but also perhaps less proven and more risky technology. This desire to be technologically aggressive -to develop and use the most attractive, most advanced technology -must be countered by forces that are more sensitive to the operational environment and more concerned with moving developmental efforts into final physical reality (Mansfield and Wagner, 1975; Utterback, 1974) .
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To balance the influence of both project and functional managers over technical details is often a difficult task. While an engineer may supposedly report to both managers in a formal sense, the degree to which both managers are actively influencing the direction, clarification, or the pursuit of technical details and solution strategies will vary considerably from project to project, depending on the ability and willingness of the two managers to become involved in details. Although involvement depends, at least in part, on one's understanding of the relevant technology and its application, project performance should be higher when the perspectives of both sides can be taken into account. Accordingly, the following is hypothesized:
Hl: Project performance will be higher when both project and functional managers are seen to exert equal influence over the detailed technical work of matrixed engineers.
Salaries and Promotions
Advocates of matrix organizations (e.g., Kingdon, 1973; Sayles, 1976; Davis and Lawrence, 1977) have long agreed on the importance of achieving balanced influence over salary and promotion decisions. Both Knight (1976) and Goggin (1974) announce the raise, the project manager's involvement will not be apparent and the engineer will come to believe that it is only the department head who counts. Engineers can acknowledge and recognize the existence of two lines of reporting, but unless they see both managers controlling their progress in terms of income and status, there will be a natural tendency for them, particularly in conflict situations, to heed the desires of one manager to the neglect of the other. The matrix then ceases to function, resulting in a structure that is more likely to resemble the pure project or functional form of organization despite any "paper" claims to the contrary.
Given that management has decided on a matrix form and that engineers recognize its existence, higher performing projects should be those in which engineers see both project and functional managers involved in the determination of their salaries and promotions. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H2: Project performance will be higher when both project and functional managers are seen to exert equal influence over the promotions and rewards of matrixed engineers.
Personnel Assignments
Personnel assignments often provide the focus for the priority battles that frequently afflict matrix organizations. With the pressure on them from both management and customers to produce, project managers often find themselves in tight competition for the resources necessary to provide results (Knight, 1977; Steiner and Ryan, 1968) . One of the most critical of these resources is technical talent. Each functional department employs engineers of varying technical backgrounds, experiences, and capabilities (Allen and Cohen, 1969) . Every project manager learns quickly which engineers are the top performers and naturally wants them assigned to his project. As a result, there develops an intense rivalry among project managers, each attempting to secure the most appropriate and most talented engineers for his project ti· (Cleland and King, 1968) . mnnaer had aratl-ar 4ftluriiw
Dcsince presumably that project will then obtain the best talent. Since the performance measure used in this study is at the project level, and realizing that high individual project performance may be sub-optimal for the organization, it will be hypothesized that:
H3: Project performance will, on the average be higher when project managers are seen to exert greater influence over personnel assignments to the projects.
Organizational Influence
In addition to the supervisory functions that go on within a project group, considerable research has shown that managers of high performing projects are also influential outside their project teams (e.g., Katz and Allen, 1982; Likert, 1967; Steiner and Ryan, 1968; Pelz, 1952) .
According to these studies, managers affect the behaviors and motivations of subordinates not only through leadership directed within the project group but also through their organizational influence outside the project (Katz and Tushman, 1981; Pfeffer, 1978) . The critical importance of organizational influence on project outcomes has also been confirmed by many studies of technological innovation (e.g., Achilladelis, et. al., 1971; Myers and Marquis, 1969) . In almost every instance, successful innovation required the strong support of organizationally powerful managers who could provide essential resources, mediate intergroup conflicts, and who were sufficiently well positioned to protect the developmental effort from sources of outside interference.
Based on these findings, if either of the two arms of the matrix is seen to have greater power in the organization at large, then the engineers' behavior should also be affected, particularly in situations of conflict. Engineers want to be on the "winning team" (Cf. Kidder, 1981 The data presented in this paper derive from a study of R&D project teams in nine major U.S. organizations. Although the selection of participating organizations could not be made random, they were chosen to represent several distinct work sectors and markets. Two of the sites are government laboratories; three are not-for-profit firms receiving most of their funding from government agencies. The four remaining companies are in private industry: two from the aerospace industry, one in electronics, and one in food processing.
In each organization, initial meetings were held with higher level research and development managers in order to understand how the R&D organization was structured, to identify the project assignments of all R&D professionals, and to learn the multiple reporting relationships and managerial and technical titles of all project members. Short meetings were then scheduled with the professionals assigned to the projects to explain the broad purposes of our study, to solicit their voluntary cooperation, and to distribute questionnaires to each professional individually.
To insure the accuracy of data on project assignments, respondents were told to answer all questions in terms of the project assignment identified on the questionnaire's front page. If this was incorrect or not up-to-date, they replaced it with their correct project assignment. Questionnaires were also tailored to the particular reporting structure with language appropriate to each project group. Individuals were asked to complete the questionnaires as soon as reasonably possible. Stamped, return envelopes were provided so that completed forms could be mailed to the investigators directly. These procedures not only insure voluntary participation, but they also enhance data quality since respondents must commit their own time and effort.
Response rates across organizations were extremely high, ranging from 82 percent to a high of 96 percent.
Although these procedures yielded over 2,000 respondents from 201 project teams, over half of the projects were not organized in a matrix.
Furthermore, few of the projects were totally matrixed in the sense that all engineers and scientists had dual reporting relationships to both project and functional managers. Only those projects in which 20 percent or more engineers in a pure matrix arrangement will be used in this analysis. This gives a total of 86 projects.2 Respondents are considered to be part of a matrix structure when they report formally to separate project and functional managers, and when these two managers have no direct reporting relationship between them. There were 486 matrixed engineers working on these 86 projects, an average of almost six matrixed engineers per project.
2 On any particular question, the number of project teams from which complete data were obtained ranged from 63 to 86.
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Matrixed Relationships
Respondents were asked to indicate (on seven-point, Likert-type scales) the degree to which their project and functional managers influenced: 1) the technical details of their project work; 2) their salary increases and promotions; 3) their selection to work on the project; and 4) the overall conduct of the organization. For each of these dimensions influence, scale responses ranged from a "1" for "my project manager dominates" to a "7" for "my functional manager dominates"; the middle point, "4", indicating that influence was balanced between the two. For each question, individual member responses were averaged to calculate overall project scores for the four influence areas and only the responses of matrixed project members were used. As described by Katz and Tushman (1979) , analysis of variance methods were used on all aggregated measures to insure the validity of combining individual perceptions to derive project scores. For each dimension of influence, lower scores will be taken to indicate project manager dominance and higher scores to indicate functional manager dominance.
Project Performance
Since comparable measures of objective performance have yet to be developed across different technologies, a subjective measure was used similar to that of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Katz and Tushman (1981) . In each organization, project performance was measured by interviewing higher level management and asking each manager (at least one hierarchical level above the project and functional managers) to indicate on a five-point, Likert-type scale whether a project team was performing above, below, or at the level expected of them. Each manager 
RESULTS
As previously explained, matrixed engineers' responses were averaged to classify projects on the degree to which project or functional managers exerted influence over each of four activity areas. To examine the way in which influence was distributed, project scores from 1 to 3 were coded as signifying dominant influence by the project manager while scores from 5 to 7 were taken to indicate functional manager dominance.
Intermediate values from 3 to 5 were considered as balanced.
The locus of influence, as shown in Table I , varies considerably both among projects and across dimensions of influence. The influence over technical details of work and personnel assignments are balanced in the majority of cases. In sharp contrast, over half of the functional managers are seen to have greater influence over salaries and promotions. Functional managers are viewed as controlling these rewards in almost 60 percent of the projects; project managers in only 7 percent. One must remember once again that it is the matrixed engineers' perceptions of the situation that is being measured, for it is perceived reality, not the reality itself, that influences engineers' behavior. Project managers may in fact have equal influence over salaries and promotions, but unless this is clearly apparent to the engineer, it will not affect his behavior.
Organizational influence, in contrast, was almost equally distributed across the three influence categories; 31 percent of the projects having a more dominant functional side, 31 percent having a more dominant project side, and 38 percent having a reasonably balanced situation.
Because the projects under investigation come from government, non-profit, and industrial organizations, it is also important to see if there are major differences across these sectors. Generally speaking, there are no significant differences in the distributions of managerial influence for the dimensions of project work details and personnel assignments. In each sector, the distributions are consistent with the percentages reported in Table I None of these organizational variations is terribly surprising. The not-for-profits with their somewhat more academic, research orientation place greater emphasis on the disciplines and functional managers are therefore accorded more power within these settings. In industry and government, there is a stronger orientation toward project management, since in both instances there is a clear-cut product or system that must be brought into being. Project managers, therefore, tend to be given (Table II) . Performance does not vary significantly with the locus of influence over technical content. Although there is a slight tendency toward higher performance with moderately high influence by the project manager or with strong influence by the functional manager, neither of these tendencies is significant and the latter result stems from only two, relatively small, development projects. In any event, balanced involvement on the part of both arms of the matrix is not related to higher project performance. Hypothesis one is not supported by the present data.
ill Salaries and Promotions. In the area of salaries and promotions, the ANOVA results of Table III show that project performance varies significantly across the locus of managerial influence. The mean performance levels in Table III Because the distribution of projects along the influence continuum is so highly skewed towards functional control, Tukey's (1977) (Table IV) . Although we hypothesized that project performance would be higher when these decisions are balanced between matrixed engineers' project and functional managers, this does not turn out to be the case--at least not to the extent that its effects can be seen across all project groupings. It is interesting to note, however, that the lowest performing set of projects are those in which the functional managers are seen as controlling the allocation of project personnel. Table V Since there is not a strong connection between organizational influence and influence over technical content of the work, the final question is whether the loci of influence in these two areas operate separately on performance or whether they interact to affect project performance. A two-way analysis of variance (Table VI) Where does this leave all of the theories and propositions regarding matrix balance? The final set of results in Table VI Finally, it should be reemphasized that the loci of influence in most of our sampled projects do not match our normative findings. This may be one reason why so many studies have reported vast levels of role conflict and ambiguity among matrixed professionals (e.g., Hill and White, 1979) . Perhaps it has been the lack of a clear understanding of how to differentiate and complement the different areas of internal and external influences that has led to so much stress and frustration in implementing and maintaining matrix-type designs. Clearly, more research is needed to understand how to staff and manage individuals in these more complicated structures, and hopefully, the findings presented here will encourage additional research in that direction.
